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This paper aims to analyze changes in foreign direct investment (FDI) capital flows 
in North America from 1990 to 2000. I would like to examine whether FDI has the 
same regionalizing tendencies as foreign trade. However the process in that case is more 
complex; since centripetal forces (incoming flows to North America) as centrifugal 
(outgoing flows) are both at work. With Mexico as a point of reference, I will also 
analyze some of the main characteristics and tendencies of FDI, as well as its impact on 
the Mexican economy. 
 
Introduction  
Neoliberal globalization is a process that began in the 1980s with 
deregulation and trade liberalization. Globalization is a complex phenomenon 
that covers three dimensions: the international mobility of goods and services, 
the mobility of productive capacities through FDI, and the mobility of financial 
capital. The domination or prevalence of one of these dimensions, define the 
three following stages of economic globalization since the order established by 
the Bretton Woods Agreement to the present day (Michalet, 2000) 1: 
 The international configuration between national States defined in 
the Bretton Woods Agreement was dominated by the foreign trade of goods and 
services (1948-1960). 
 The configuration characterized and dominated by private flows of 
FDI made by transnational corporations (1960-1982). 
 Neoliberal globalization dominated by financial capital flows (1982 
to date). 
Neoliberal globalization involves a new regime of accumulation, with 
financial domination (Chesnais, 2000) 2, which has increased the financial 
fragility of both “internal” financial systems and the international monetary and 
financial system.  
This regime of accumulation with financial domination is characterized, 
amongst other traits, by the predominance of non banking financial firms 
(pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies etc.) and the weakening of 
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commercial banks, which are forced to compete in disadvantageous conditions 
with non banking financial intermediaries (banks no banks) in order to attract 
deposits. This translates into a process of banking deintermediation. Capital 
markets become more prominent than banking credit in financing enterprises.  
This new regime of accumulation radically changes the way corporations are 
managed. These large companies follow a fundamentally financial logic. Their 
profitability and the incomes derived from stock options do not depend so much 
on the productive and internal strength of the firm, but on its increased value on 
the stock market. The opinion of institutional investors in financial markets 
becomes the main barometer of how corporations and governments should 
behave. Mergers and acquisitions, that were popular over the last decade, were 
decided not only on the basis of productive or trade potential, but more 
importantly on their repercussions on market share value. These mergers were a 
powerful lever that propelled stock market boom of the 1990s. 
I will begin with the hypothesis that changes to the productive systems of 
Canada and Mexico, in addition to the structure, composition, and geographical 
orientation of foreign trade flows, have been determined fundamentally by the 
movement of foreign capital. 
Since the trade liberalization of both countries, and mainly since the signing 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the strategies of the 
primary transnational corporations were as follows: 
« Global » corporations that follow a global logic focused on the world 
market and/or  the North American market, combining this with the 
restructuring of internal private groups in Canada and Mexico in order to adapt 
themselves to globalization process determine: 1) changes in asset ownership, 
2) the sector and geographic location of investment and 3) the geographic 
destination of produced goods (foreign market vs. domestic market: North 
American market vs. world market). FDI has, in this way, contributed to 
strengthening « transnational » regions in North America (e.g. the north of 
Mexico – the south of the United States: The northeast of the United States – 
the southeast of Canada). 
NAFTA is a good example of this kind of integration, as it has been the main 
field of experimentation for Neoliberal globalization, whose operating rules are 
established by US financial capital with the support of dominating groups and 
the Canadian and Mexican governments. In the trade agreement between 
Canada and the United States, and subsequently, NAFTA, a series of rules were 
approved for foreign investors granting unlimited freedom, as well as a series of 
privileges. For the United States, the trading area of North America is 
transcendent, not only in outlining the rules of future continental integration in 
the context of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, but also in the size of its 
investments, as well as its trade in Canada and Mexico. 13 percent of US direct 
investment is in these two countries and a total of 65 percent of its investments 
in the American continent (Deblock, Brunelle and Rioux, 2001). 3 
                                               
3
 Christian Deblock, Dorval Brunelle y Michèle Rioux. Globalisation, Investissements et 
Concurrence la Voie du Régionalisme: le Projet des Amériques. Montréal, Centre D’Etudes 
Internationales et Mondialisation. Université de Québec à Montréal. P. 23 
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The basis of foreign capital operations is found in chapters 11 and 17 of 
NAFTA. 
The following dispositions are established: 
 Foreign investors must be treated in the same way as national 
investors. 
 Contracting parties must be granted most-favored-nation status, that 
is the obligation to treat investors from the signatory nations no less favorably 
than investors from other nations. 
 Foreign investors must be given “appropriate and efficient 
protection” of intellectual property rights. 
 The establishment of comportment standards for FDI is forbidden 
for national product content, as well as the preferential trading of goods and 
services on national territory, establishing exporting minimums such as 
mechanisms strengthening the trade balance, in addition to any other obligations 
regarding technology transference. 
 Total freedom of FDI capital movement and portfolio investment 
flows is granted, in addition to the transference of utilities, dividends, royalties, 
interest, asset sales, administrative and other costs. 
 The expropriation of assets considered of public interest is greatly 
limited, if they are not discriminatory. Appropriate compensation will be given 
equivalent to the “fair market value” of the investment, and this will be paid 
exponentially and in the hard currency of the G7 nations. 
 In the case of disputes, the signatory nations have the right to appeal 
to an international tribunal of their choice, which removes the decision-making 
capacity from national tribunals. 
These rules allow the signatory nations to keep a Neoliberal course of trade 
liberalization and eliminate all restrictions of foreign capital operations. Their 
application greatly limits the possibility of establishing an active and 
independent industrial policy or to protect determined sectors and economic 
activity. Since the 1980s, both Canada and Mexico have abandoned their former 
nationalist and regulatory foreign investment policies. Intellectual property 
rights, although attempt to guarantee the protection of innovation and fight 
piracy, are an obstacle that conserve the advantages enjoyed by oligopolies. 
This triggers high prices and incredible profits for transnational corporations. 
NAFTA-approved FDI regulations constitute a model for transnational 
corporations and financial trade on a world scale. NAFTA served as a basis for 
the World Investment Agreement presented in 1995 by the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It currently serves as a base 
for the continental negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
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FDI TENDENCIES IN NORTH AMERICA 
 
The United States and Canada are just as much capital exporters as 
importers, whereas Mexico is basically a capital importer. 
I will analyze both FDI inflows and outflows from the United States and 
Canada. In the case of Mexico, I will analyze inflows. This study includes 
information on FDI stocks, as this source is thought to show adjustments to 
long-term tendencies clearly. 
 
The United States 
Capital Inflows 
Over the last 20 years the United States has become a net capital importer, 
despite being the largest capital exporter in the world. In 2000, 272.9 billion 
dollars of FDI entered the United States, with 113.8 billion dollars leaving the 
country. Accumulated FDI increased to 1.23 trillion dollars, slightly less than 
the 1.24 trillion dollars placed by the United States around the world. 
As you can see from the figure 1, despite the increased integration of North 
America and the intensification of intraregional trade, the relative position of 
Canada and Mexico in accumulated FDI in the United States did not change as a 
result of the signing of free trade agreements. The participation of Canada 
stayed between eight and nine percent of the total. The position of Mexico, 
despite quadrupling in absolute terms during the last decade (from 575 million 
dollars in 1990 to 2.47 billion dollars in 2000) continues to be insignificant in 
relative terms; 0.2 % of the total FDI placed in the United States. 
The most significant change during this period is the increase of European 
investment. Europe’s FDI increased from 247.3 billion dollars in 1990 to 890.6 
billion dollars in 2000. Europe’s participation increased over nine percentage 
points, increasing during this period from 62.6 to 71.9 %. The participation of 
Japan and the Asian Tigers, inversely, fell by almost eight percentage points 
from 23.5 to 15.7 %. This is due to the effects of the Japanese financial crisis of 
the 1990s and the Asian crisis of 1997 to 1998 that is apparent in the stunted 
growth of FDI flows from this region. 
 
Capital Outflows 
The US’s FDI in Canada and Mexico increased significantly between 1990 
and 2000. In the case of the former, FDI stock from the United States almost 
doubled during the last decade, increasing to 69.5 billion dollars in 1990 to 
126.4 billion dollars in 2000. In the case of Mexico, the increase is much more 
marked, with the increase of FDI, during the same period, more than tripling 
from 10.3 billion dollars to 35.4 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the position of 
both countries weakened in relation to other regions, in particularly Europe, 
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Japan, and the Asian Tigers and Dragons, contrary to what happened to foreign 
trade flows, which are mainly intraregional flows. 14 Canada as a destination for 
US Foreign Direct Investment on a global level fell from 16.7 % in 1990 to 10.1 
% in 2000, with Mexico (in global terms marginal) receiving increased 
investment of a little more than half a percentage point, from 2.2 % to 2.9% of 
the total. 
On the other hand, the position of the United States in Europe has continued 
to strengthen with European integration. Europe’s involvement in US FDI stock 
increased from 44.5 % in 1982 to 52.1 % in 2000. In the same way, during the 
same period, the position of Asia increased, although to a lesser extent from 
13.6% to 16% (Figure 2). 
 
Canada 
Capital Inflows 
Canada has historically been a net capital importer and increased economic 
integration with the United States was forged by North American FDI in 
Canada. Since the Inter-War period, when British hegemony went into decline 
and US hegemony emerged, US investment has been dominant. Canada’s 
tendency to be a net capital importer changed in the 1990s, when its FDI capital 
outflows began to surpass its inflows. In 2000, FDI  total stock in Canada was 
291.5 billion Canadian dollars, whilst outward Canadian FDI totaled 301.4 
billion Canadian dollars. 
Blomström and Kokko (1997) 5 argue that free trade agreements with the 
United States and Mexico have increased growth faster than FDI interregional 
and intraregional flows. They maintain that: 1) since the US-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement, and subsequently NAFTA with Mexico, US FDI flows to Canada 
effectively increased from 1992, especially as a result of the devaluation of the 
Canadian dollar and 2) Canadian investment flows to the United States 
lessened, faced with increased flows to the European Union and other regions. 
Information gathered during this study proves the validity of this thesis. In 
the case of capital inflows, US flows increased, not only as a result of the 
devaluation of the Canadian dollar at the time, but also as a consequence of 
investment repositioning caused by NAFTA in North America. US FDI stock in 
Canada increased 2.2 times from 84 billion Canadian dollars in 1990 to 186.2 
billion Canadian dollars in 2000. As a percentage of total stock, it increased 
from 64.2 % in 1990 to 69.5% in 1999. During 2000 there was a significant 
slowdown in US flows to Canada. Given the historically limited economic 
relationship between Canada and Mexico, and the distinct capital importing 
character of the latter, total stock of Mexican FDI is only 3.2 billion Canadian 
dollars, 0.05% of the total (Figure 3). 
                                               
4
 Arturo Guillén R. (2001) Flujos comerciales en el marco del Tratado de Libre Comercio de 
America del Norte. Revista Comercio Exterior. Vol. 51, Num. 6, Mexico, BANCOMEXT, p. 467-
479.   
5
 Magnus Blomström and Ari Kokko (1997). Regional Integration and Foreign Direct 
Investment. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research. Working paper 6019 
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The relative involvement of Europe in Canada is declining, although it did 
increase notably in 2000. This indicates that Europe has been more interested in 
penetrating the US market directly and using Mexico as an export platform, 
than investing in Canada. In the case of Asia, the relative involvement of Japan 
and the Asian Tigers in FDI in Canada increased, although the process lost 
momentum with the Asian crisis of 1997 to 1998. 
 
Capital Outflows 
NAFTA did not imply increased Canadian FDI outflows to the United 
States. On the contrary, the relative involvement of the United States in 
Canada’s FDI outward stock fell from 61% of the total in 1990 to 52.2% in 
2000 (Figure 4). This is not the case with Mexico; despite its marginal position, 
it increased involvement from 0.2% to 1%. 
It is noteworthy to mention the importance given by Canada to Southern 
Cone nations. The involvement of Central and South America in its FDI stock 
increased substantially from 2.4% in 1990 to 5.9% in 2000. Regarding Canada’s 
FDI comportment in other regional trade blocs, its involvement in Europe 
remained stable, yet increased in Asia during the first half of the 1990s, 
although it lessened slightly during the second half of the decade. 
 
Mexico 
Capital Inflows 
FDI stock in Mexico in 2000 was 127.6 billion dollars, an increase of 
321.9% from the 1990 total of 30.2 billion dollars. During this period, there 
were significant changes to the composition of FDI inflows from the countries 
of origin. The most significant change was the growing prominence of 
investment from the two NAFTA partners, especially since the agreement went 
into force. The total involvement of the United States and Canada went from 
64.3% in 1990 to 68.3% in 2000 (Figure 5). Despite the predominance of 
interregional flows compared to intraregional flows in the case of the United 
States and Canada, for Mexico the latter are more significant owing to the 
investment repositioning strategies by transnational corporations from Canada 
and the United States. These Mexico-based corporations are searching for the 
comparative advantages of setting up branch offices or assembly plants on the 
northern Mexican border. 
The weight of US FDI continues to be predominant. Mexico’s involvement 
in FDI stock increased from 62.9% in 1990 to 65% in 2000. 
Canadian investment in Mexico has increased significantly over the last 
seven years. In June 2000, there were 1,195 companies operating with Canadian 
capital, representing 6.2% of the total. From 1994 to 2000, FDI capital inflows 
from Canada increased to 2.7 billion dollars—4.2% of the total. Canada is 
currently the seventh largest investor in Mexico, after the United States, 
Holland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Spain, in this order. 
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The relative position of Europe in Mexico’s FDI stock has not changed since 
the last decade. European countries currently participate with 24% of total 
assets in Mexico. Japan is facing a similar situation. Owing to Japan’s financial 
crisis, its interest in Mexico has diminished. 
 
GLOBALIZATION VS. REGIONALIZATION  
IN THE LOGIC OF FDI 
 
The information presented in this paper confirms that the tendencies to 
globalize and regionalize in FDI flows are juxtaposed: 
 The larger part of capital outflows from Canada and the United 
States is located in other regions: the European Union, other European nations, 
and Asia; mainly China and Southeast Asia. 
 The same behavior is seen in other regional trade blocs (the 
European Union and Asia), as seen with the comportment of capital inflows in 
both Canada and the United States, where the relative presence of European and 
Japanese capital increases. 
 A part of the capital outflows from Canada and the United States –
the smallest—respond to a strategy of redistribution within North America 
through competitive advantages. This tendency is confirmed by an analysis of 
capital inflows from Mexico, where the relative importance of Canada and the 
United States as investors increases compared to capital from other parts of the 
world. 
Over the last two decades, the behavior of FDI flows indicates that the most 
powerful transnational corporations follow a logic of globalization. Global 
companies, whose perspective is a world market—not circumscribing to a 
determined national market. In other words, the profitable reproduction of this 
capital is only conceivable in the context of a growing global economy. This is 
valid not only for US transnational corporations, but also for the Europeans, 
Japanese, and for some of the emerging nations. These global players are the 
driving force behind trade liberalization and of unlimited operation of capital all 
over the world. 
Neoliberal globalization is unable to progress on the multilateral basis 
desired by the most traditional exponents of free trade (Bhagwati, 1991) 6 and 
can only do so through agreements based on regional integration as is the case 
of North America and the European Union + or the de facto constitution of 
regional trade blocks, as is the case of Japan and Southeast Asia.7 
                                               
6
 J. Bhagwati (1991). The World Trading System at Risk. London, Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 153 
+
 It is known that trade agreements in the European Union and NAFTA are different, since they 
have respond to different purposes and historic processes; however, they have similar roles in the 
context globalization and competition in the world market. 
7
 NAFTA is located in the context of what the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEPAL) has defined as “Open Regionalism”—regionalism that does not necessarily 
oppose globalization. See German de la Reza and Raul Conde (2000). Nuevas Dimensiones de la 
Integración. Del TLCAN al Regionalism Hermisférico. Mexico, UAMI, Plaza y Valdés Ed. P. 257 
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US trade implements a policy of advancing global trade liberalization, by 
using all levels or means; unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally or regionally; if 
and when there is trade liberalization is dependent on the interests of the United 
States and must be in agreement with the rules established by them.  
Global corporations belonging to the three signatory nations use the main 
strategy of positioning themselves within rival trade blocs in order to benefit 
from trade preferences that stem from integration and increase their markets 
within this area. Nevertheless, together with the centrifugal forces deriving from 
FDI there are also centripetal forces at work. Each regional bloc is the space 
used by transnational corporations from in/out of the region, and to increase 
competitiveness have moved specific activities or stages of their processes to 
the “periphery” (Mexico does this, and to a lesser extent Canada under NAFTA; 
Portugal, Greece, and Spain; Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, in the Asian bloc). As a result of this there are also intraregional FDI 
flows. 
 
The Logic of Interregional Flows 
In the case of interregional flows, the strategy involves positioning oneself in 
the space of rival trade blocs, with the objective of betting on trade protection 
toward third nations (tariff and no tariff barriers) and enjoying the advantages 
derived from integration (Blomström y Kokko, 1997) 8. 
Nations that export capital are global players, that follow a logic of 
reproduction that is not from a specific regional bloc, but from the world market 
as a whole. This is why FDI flows within the three signatory nations prevail 
over the movements of other nations.  This FDI attempts to avoid the protection 
of regional trade blocs towards third nations, placing its capital within the 
integrated space, instead of exporting goods from other spaces. 
The result is what Kindleberger (1966) 9 calls “the creation of investment” as 
a response to the “trade diversion” caused by non-multilateral free trade 
agreements. Bhagwati (1991) 10 defines this type of foreign investment as quid 
pro quo (one thing for another) and according to him, it plays the most 
important role in transnational strategy (particularly Japanese transnational 
corporations in the United States). The fact that the majority of FDI goes 
between the “triade” is a proof that in the context of international trade of 
corporate mercantilism in force, the decisive factor is the competitive 
advantages derived from the economies of scale generated by “agglomeration” 
at the dynamic poles of the system.  
 
                                               
8
 Magnus Blomström and Ari Kokko (1997). 
9
 Charles Kindleberger. (1966) European Integration and the Industrial Corporation. Columbia 
Journal of World Business. Vol. 1. P65-73 
10
 J. Bhagwati (1991). The Theory of Political Economy, Economic Policy, and Foreign 
Investment. Political Economy and International Economics. Cambridge University Press. P. 153-
167 
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The Logic of Intrarregional Flows  
In this case direct invest aiming to benefit from the comparative advantages 
of labor costs, transaction costs (transport costs and less rigid tax systems) and 
less strict environmental laws, generate agglomeration processes in the regional 
spaces where they are located (Hanson, 1998) 11. 
This is the case of FDI flows that have entered Mexico since trade 
liberalization of the mid 1980s and specifically since the signing of NAFTA. 
Investment during this period was mainly derived from the automotive and auto 
part industry, as well as assembly-for-export industry, especially electronics, 
computers, and manufactured goods. Between 1994 and 1998, the assembly-for-
export industry absorbed 12.6% of registered FDI flows (Dussel, 2000) 12.  
Transnational corporations and the assembly-for-export industry are the 
nuclei of the Mexican export sector. The involvement of exports in total sales of 
US branch offices in Mexico increased from 27.3% in 1992 to 46.3% in 1997. 
Owing basically to the action of direct investment detonated by NAFTA, 
Mexico, according to Dussel, has become: 
 The third largest exporter to the United States, after Canada and 
Japan. 
 The largest supplier of electronic goods (televisions, personal 
computers, printers, etc.) to the US market since 1998, totaling 19.6% of US 
imports. 
 The third largest supplier of automotive products, second only to 
Canada. 
 The main exporter of manufactured goods, absorbing 13.8 of US 
imports in 1998, against barely 2.8% in 1990. 
With the signing of NAFTA, it was hoped that the assembly-for-export 
industry would gradually disappear and be replaced by a more stable export 
industry. But instead of the industrialization of the assembly-for-export 
industry, there has been a boom. Electronic, computer and manufactured goods, 
auto parts, etc.—complete branches of the manufacturing industry—operate 
almost entirely as assembly-for-export, with limited ties to the domestic market. 
In this way, while employment in the manufacturing industry remained stagnant 
from 1994 to 2000, at 1,372,253 jobs increasing barely to 1,483,899, 
employment in the assembly-for-export industry increased from 600,585 to 
1,242,779, during the same period. (Vidal, 2001) 13. 
Export production has concentrated in the northern border area. It has caused 
a dragging affect for investment, towards the north of Mexico and towards the 
south of the United States. From 1994 to 1998, 15.6% of FDI concentrated in 
                                               
11
 Gordon H Hanson (1998). North American Economic Integration and Industry Location. 
Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 6587. p. 33. 
12
 Enrique Dussel P. (2000). La Inversión Extranjera en México. (CEPAL, Productive 
Development Series. No. 80. On Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Mexico, see Carlos Rozo 
(2002) Flujos de Inversión Extranjera Directa a México y el TLCAN in Moneda, Flujos de 
Capital e Integración Económica. Mexico, UAM (awaiting publication) 
13
 Gregorio Vidal (2001). Corporaciones, Inversión Extranjera y Mercado Externo en México en 
México y la Economía Mundial. Mexico, Miguel Angel Porrúa Ed., UAMI. p. 23 
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the north of Mexico and increased from 21% of the total to 29.8%, whilst jobs 
in the manufacturing industry in the metropolitan area of Mexico City fell from 
46.4% to 28.7% over the same period. 
The centripetal movement to the north of Mexico is not limited to foreign 
investment in this region, but also causes a dragging movement and the 
repositioning of other investments made by national and international 
companies that formerly operated in the central region and aim to approach the 
US market and benefit from the economies of scale generated by a process of 
agglomeration in the northern border area. Around the exporting pole 
“backwards” or “forwards” activities come together and not only on the 
Mexican side of the border—as a consequence of low levels of integration of 
the assembly-for-export industry and the export sector with the domestic 
productive system, above all on the US side of the border. Regional productive 
chains of a transnational nature are produced that substitute national productive 
chains, formed during the stage of import substitution. 
Growing integration between Canada, the United States, and Mexico over 
the last two decades involves the strengthening of historic tendencies creating a 
North American regional bloc, under the hegemony of the United States that 
could extend to the rest of the American continent under the influence of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas that seeks to convert it into a free trade area by 
2005. 
Increased integration of the North American continents has caused the 
significant restructuring of domestic productive systems. Regionalization has 
allowed the modernization of the export sector of the economy, but at the price 
of marginalizing the rest of the productive system, which continues to be 
dependent on national or local markets. 
The heterogeneous structure of the system, structural dualism, has become 
more pronounced, leaving large sectors and social groups on the margins of the 
benefits of globalization. The exclusion is not only social, but also geographic. 
Wealth tends to concentrate in the north, whilst the south of Mexico is 
becoming poorer and is marginalized by the state of affairs brought about by 
Neoliberal globalization. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Transnational corporations and financial capital are the dominant forces 
behind Neoliberal globalization. 
Under NAFTA transnational corporations follow a globalizing logic in 
regards to markets and profitability, which determine major changes to the 
productive systems of Canada and Mexico, as well as the composition and 
direction of foreign trade and the main changes to asset ownership, that is 
capital structure. 
During the period under analysis (1990-2000) two distinct FDI logics were 
followed that were interrelated. The first was positioning within rival trade 
blocs (the European Union and Asia), betting on protectionism, benefiting from 
trade preferences determined by integration agreements, and taking advantage 
of dynamic competitive advantages. The second tendency concerned Canada 
and above all Mexico, and this was the repositioning of investment in North 
America, in order to benefit from the comparative advantages of labor costs, 
transport costs, and more lenient environmental laws. Another strategy was to 
take advantage of the financial crises and the privatization of state-run 
companies, in order to acquire inexpensive assets, especially in the energy, 
trade, and finance sectors. 
In the case of Mexico, FDI operations have increased transnationalization, 
the assembly-for-export industry, and the growing service industry of its 
increasingly dominated, heterogeneous, and unarticulated financial and 
productive system. The main problem of Neoliberal globalization, driven by 
transnational corporations and financial capital, is not only that it makes 
inequalities more prominent within the countries, but its intrinsic nature is also 
unstable, which is a source of recurrent financial and economic crises as 
observed during the last two decades. The problem with Neoliberal 
globalization is believing that trade liberalization and deregulation will 
automatically lead to regulation via the market.   
It is true that economic globalization is an irreversible process. But we will 
not get very far; instead, we will move backward, if we fall into the trap of 
believing that to resolve problems, we must continue the indiscriminate trade 
liberalization of markets until they behave as dictated by neoclassic handbooks.  
On the other hand, in order to correct irregularities and inequalities, we must 
look for an active and democratically decided place in globalization, and apply 
alternative development strategies of a global nature that keep in mind national 
and local level necessities. These should further South-South integration and 
radically reform the monetary and international financial system—not just 
“plombery” as advocated by the IMF with its “new internal financial 
architecture.” It implies the creation of genuinely democratic international 
bodies that make the global regulation of direct investment and capital flows 
possible, resolving foreign debt through its cancellation; and organizing and 
administrating ordered transference from surplus countries to those of the 
periphery of the system. 
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Al this implies not a smaller state, but a bigger and better one, on both 
international and national levels. The market as organizing factotum of the 
economy, is pure metaphysics. According to Perroux (1982), “A market, is only 
conceivable within society. A society only exists through a finality (the State), 
which puts determined objectives in order.” 14  
                                               
14
 Ibid. p. 409   
15  Foreign Direct Investment in North America under NAFTA 
 
 
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. 
Investment  in U. S.A By Country of Origin (Historical Basis)
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FIGURE 2 : U.S.A. 
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FIGURE 3 : Canada 
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FIGURE 4 Canada 
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FIGURE 5 : México 
 
 Investment in Mexico By Country of Origin (Historical Basis)
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